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WITHDRAWING FROM CUSTOM: CHOOSING 
BETWEEN DEFAULT RULES 
RACHEL BREWSTER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s article, Withdrawing from 
International Custom, is a novel, provocative, and important contribution 
to the scholarship on customary international law. They argue that the 
current approach to customary international law, the Mandatory View, 
which holds that states cannot unilaterally opt out of custom but allows 
states to do so by treaty, is overly restrictive. They propose an alternative 
approach, the Default View, which would permit states to opt out 
unilaterally when doing so would not injure another nation. The article 
raises a number of interesting issues, including how the Mandatory View 
became the consensus in international law scholarship, the role of the 
persistent objector principle, and the functional value of maintaining the 
Mandatory View. The article also forces us to rethink what the current rules 
regarding withdrawal from customary law are, how the rules have evolved 
to the current view, and (most importantly) what the best approach going 
forward is. 
This Article addresses some of the issues left open by Bradley and 
Gulati’s work. It attempts to judge what approach is better given the 
criterion that Bradley and Gulati put forward. Specifically, this article asks 
whether the functional benefits of the Default View are greater than those 
of the Mandatory View going forward. Using the authors’ standard, I argue 
that it is unclear whether a shift to the Default View is best for the system. 
Part I of this article discusses the potential effects of Bradley and Gulati’s 
thesis on treaty law, an issue of significant importance but one that the 
authors do not currently take into account. I then turn to the core of Bradley 
and Gulati’s argument—how a shift from the Mandatory View to the 
Default View would affect the system of customary international law. Part 
II attempts to tease out the essential difference between the Mandatory 
View and the Default View for states considering changes to customary 
law, while Part III discusses the conditions that would have to hold for the 
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Default View to be beneficial using Bradley and Gulati’s functional 
standard. The thesis proposed by Bradley and Gulati is worthy of 
discussion and debate, but also it also raises questions and concerns that the 
authors need to address more fully. 
I. TREATY LAW, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE DEFAULT VIEW 
Bradley and Gulati provide a comprehensive account of the current 
state of customary international law, a position that they describe as the 
Mandatory View.1 Customary law binds all states, even absent a specific 
indication of consent by the state. There are two means by which states can 
avoid these obligations: (1) states can claim persistent objector status, 
although this is only open to states that objected at the time of the custom’s 
formation; or (2) states can deviate from custom by creating a treaty that 
establishes a different rule.2 The treaty rule displaces the customary rule as 
the operative law between the parties to the treaty, providing the parties 
with a means of opting out of custom with like-minded states. Thus even 
under the Mandatory View, customary international law is not always 
“mandatory.” A state can opt out of custom, even after the formation of the 
customary rule, by creating a treaty regime with other like-minded states. If 
the treaty has a sufficiently wide membership, it could displace the 
customary rule entirely. 
Bradley and Gulati’s Default View offers an alternative to the 
consensus understanding of when customary international law is binding. 
They argue that each state should be able to decide unilaterally what parts 
of customary international law to accept. If a state wants to adopt a policy 
that is contrary to custom, the state can renounce the customary rule so 
long as it does not injure other states. The authors’ basis for advocating this 
alternative is twofold. They argue that the Default View is closer to the pre-
World War II understanding of custom, although their justification does not 
rest on history alone. They further contend that the Default View is a better 
approach to customary international law on functional grounds. This 
Article only addresses the functional argument. 
As an initial consideration when judging the benefits of the two 
approaches, we must consider the effect the Default View may have on the 
institution of treaty law. Bradley and Gulati pitch their argument as relating 
exclusively to the institution of customary law, but the ramifications of 
their thesis extend to treaty law as well. Treaty law has become the 
 
 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 208-15 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 211-12. 
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dominant form for legal rules for many areas of international law, including 
security law (arms control and use of force), international trade law, and 
some areas of human rights (the treatment of combatants and non-
combatants in war). Yet changes to the rules governing customary law 
influence treaties as well. The two sources of law are deeply intertwined: 
shifting to the Default View could have significant ramifications on states’ 
expectations of how existing treaties will be interpreted and on the ability 
of future treaties to establish clear expectations. 
Treaties exist in part because of custom. The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which establishes rules for 
treaty law, is accepted by some nations—notably the United States—only 
as customary law.3 Bradley and Gulati’s Default View would allow states 
to withdraw from the Vienna Convention (or parts of the Vienna 
Convention) unilaterally. This is significant because it would also allow 
states to change the meaning of a treaty. For instance, many existing 
treaties take for granted that national governments are responsible for treaty 
violations by sub-national government actors as a matter of customary 
treaty law.4 A withdrawal from the customary treaty law would allow states 
to relieve themselves of the responsibility for these actors. Such a change to 
the customary law of treaties could have significant implications on the 
meaning of existing treaties, including diplomatic and economic treaties 
where the federal government is responsible for the actions of sub-national 
actors.5 For instance, the United States government could claim to not be 
responsible for the actions of the Texas state officials violations of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Similar examples could be 
made using other common treaty rules that are accepted by states as 
customary law, including rules on entry in force, ratification, accession, 
reservations, breach, or amendment. 6 
 
 3. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 433-34 (2004). 
 4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1960, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 5. See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 
12, 20 (Mar. 31) (holding the United States federal government responsible for the actions of Texas 
officials); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 
2000), 5 ICSID (W. Bank) . 212 (2002) (holding the Mexican government responsible for the actions of 
state and local officials). 
 6. Another issue of importance to U.S. law that the authors’ do not explicitly discuss is the how 
the Default View would affect Alien Tort Claims Act suits. If the United States withdrew from a rule of 
customary human rights law but other states did not, could federal courts still hear suits based on 
foreign violations of the human rights customary law rule? The custom would still be international law 
if the US withdrew, but the jurisdictional basis for the suit might disappear if the rule was no longer part 
of the United States law. 
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Stable customary rules are fundamental to the regime of treaty law. 
Although states can alter the Vienna Convention’s treaty rules by explicitly 
including different procedural provisions, having a default system of treaty 
law procedures is critical to establishing common expectations and 
understandings. The Default View threatens to destabilize this shared 
understanding on the nature of treaty rules. This is a significant cost given 
the extent to which modern economic and security agreements rest on 
treaty agreements. And it is a cost that Bradley and Gulati do not address 
when evaluating the relative costs of benefits of their proposed approach to 
customary law. 
II. DEFINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MANDATORY 
VIEW AND THE DEFAULT VIEW 
The next two parts discuss Bradley and Gulati’s article on its own 
terms. This part examines what the essential difference is between the 
Mandatory View and the Default View. The next part analyzes what 
conditions are necessary for the Default View to be a functionally better 
approach for the international system. 
Bradley and Gulati describe the current approach as the Mandatory 
View, but the current approach does hold that states are always bound to 
customary international law in their relations with others. The Mandatory 
View incorporates a type of “default” rule. The default rule requires some 
agreement from other states, either multilaterally or bilaterally. In practice, 
states can select a rule different from the customary rule if the parties 
explicitly decide to do so by treaty. The Default View discussed by Bradley 
and Gulati is a unilateral version of the Mandatory View’s “default rule” 
approach: the state can choose to opt out of customary law by announcing 
unilaterally that it no longer intends to follow the rule in the future.7 
The difference between the two approaches is not whether states can 
opt out of customary international law—states may opt out under both 
views—but rather, under what conditions they may do so. The Mandatory 
View requires the agreement of the partner state or states, while the Default 
View does not require any external consent although this view might 
include a notice or no-injury requirement.8 Thus, the major divergence 
between the two views is status of the customary law with regard to states 
that have not formed treaties to alter the customary rule. The Default View 
would provide states with far more leeway to opt out of custom with non-
treaty partners, while the Mandatory View would maintain custom as a 
 
 7. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 213-15. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
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legal obligation between non-treaty partners. Yet even this understanding 
of the Mandatory View may be overly stringent because the decision of 
states to contract around the customary rule affects the status of the 
relevant rule as custom. The opinio juris element of the customary rule is 
undermined if many states choose to deviate from it by creating contrary 
treaty law. For example, customary rules on international investment are 
currently undergoing such a re-examination.9 The traditional rule that states 
must reimburse foreign investors for any government expropriation has 
long been contested,10 but the recent trend towards bilateral investment 
treaties (notwithstanding the failure to reach a multilateral investment 
agreement) has led some arbitrators and scholars to conclude that these 
treaties are reshaping customary international law.11 
The extent of the difference between the two views may turn on how 
broadly the Default View’s restriction on notice and no-injury is 
interpreted. Bradley and Gulati observe that the historical Default View 
included an injury restriction. In the author’s discussion of pre-World War 
II international law scholars, they note Vattel’s understanding was that 
states are only able to withdraw from custom “at a time when no particular 
Nation will be affected by the new rule.”12 Bradley and Gulati appear to 
embrace this restriction in their understanding of the Default View, 
although the contours of the restriction as interpreted by Bradley and Gulati 
are ambiguous.13 The line could be drawn either with regard to the 
historical practice or with regard to what the optimal rule would be today 
(the two might be different). But the authors’ present explanation of the 
boundaries of this injury requirement is too opaque to make any predictions 
about what customary law would be eligible for withdrawal under the 
Default View. 
This is an area that the authors (or others) need to flesh out more if we 
are to have a realistic picture of how the Default View would function. We 
could have a robust form of this restriction—no withdrawal that affects the 
interests of another state is permitted – or a weak form—withdrawal is 
permitted so long as it is not opportunistic. These two forms of the 
 
 9. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536 (John H. Jackson ed., 2d. 
ed. 2008). 
 10. See id. at 536-37. 
 11. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 128-30 (2003). 
 12. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 217 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 385-86 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) 
(1758). 
 13. See id. at 213-23, 250-51 & 252. 
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restriction have very different implications for when the Default View 
permits withdrawal in areas where customary law is influential. 
 For example, in international investment law, the robust form of the 
injury restriction would seem to prevent states from withdrawing from 
customary rules to respect foreign investment with regard to any existing 
investments.14 Withdrawing from these customary rules would adversely 
affect the interests of foreign private investors, and by extension, the 
investors’ home state. States would be free to withdraw from customary 
rules regarding future investments, although, as a domestic policy option, 
this might be significantly less politically desirable to the host government. 
By contrast, the weak form of the restriction would allow the state to 
withdraw from customary rules on investment with regard to existing 
investments, so long as the state was not acting opportunistically. This 
could occur where a state did not take an ownership interest in the property 
wished to enact rules to restrict the property’s use, such as rigorous 
environmental standards. Some investment arbitration panels have found 
environmental regulation to be a form of expropriation, and thus the state 
might want to withdraw from customary rules out of concern that the 
environmental regulations would run afoul of international investment 
rule.15 Here, the state would not be acting opportunistically—the 
regulations could be adopted in a non-discriminatory manner and with no 
intent to appropriate the foreign investment.  
A different issue arises with the customary law of human rights. In 
this area of law, states have interest in the global respect for human rights, 
not just the human rights of its nationals. Thus, a state’s interests are 
implicated whenever there is an alteration of human rights law with regard 
to any person anywhere. Under the robust form of the restriction, states 
would never be allowed to withdraw from human rights custom. Under the 
weak form of the restriction, the issue would be whether the state was 
acting opportunistically—for instance, withdrawing human rights 
guarantees during periods of political unrest or during elections. The weak 
 
 14. The substance of customary international law regarding foreign investment is contested. See, 
e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at Part VI. Nonetheless, customary international law is still viewed by 
many scholars as including minimum standards for foreign investment. See, e.g., SURYA P. SUBEDI, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 55 (2008). Arbitration 
panels also frequently find that customary international law includes minimum standards. See, e.g., 
Loewen Group v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), 7 
ICSID (W. Bank) 442 (2005) (holding that the trial in question and the verdict rendered are 
incompatible with “minimum standards of international law”). 
 15. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp., supra note 5. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Vicki 
Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protection and the 
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003). 
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version may therefore allow states to withdraw from some non-jus cogens 
human rights protections during periods of relative social and political 
calm. 
 In short, the difference between the Mandatory View and the 
Default View need not be tremendous, although it is hard to know its true 
extent given the current formulation of the Default View. The Mandatory 
View permits states to withdraw from custom by treaty—that is, withdraw 
with bilateral or multilateral consent—while the Default View allows states 
to withdraw from custom unilaterally, subject to an injury restriction. The 
stronger the Default View’s restrictions on withdrawal, the more the 
Mandatory View and Default View converge. Yet there is still a significant 
area where a shift from the Mandatory View to the Default View would be 
important. 
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SHIFTING FROM THE 
MANDATORY TO THE DEFAULT VIEW 
As Bradley and Gulati discuss, shifting between these regimes has 
costs and benefits.16 My discussion draws on the points that they raise and 
evaluates the costs and benefits using the standards that Bradley and Gulati 
do.17 Both the Mandatory View and the Default View incorporate the use 
of default rules, but each permits states to withdraw from custom on 
different terms. Adopting the functional view that Bradley and Gulati take, 
which approach is best depends on the relative costs of each.18 This Part 
evaluates those costs and examines the conditions in which each approach 
would be optimal. 
A. Defining the Costs and Benefits 
One state’s withdrawal from custom can impose significant costs on 
other states. The Mandatory View provides some protection to this class of 
potentially injured parties. The withdrawing state must seek the consent of 
the other states through treaty negotiations. The affected state can thus 
demand compensation for any injury during treaty negotiations. So long as 
the withdrawing state’s benefit from establishing a new rule is greater than 
the costs of the change to the other state, a treaty should be possible.19 
 
 16. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 241-54. 
 17. This Part’s discussion of the Default View incorporates the weak form of the restriction on the 
state’s ability to withdraw from custom so that the two views will not converge. 
 18. Of course we can have non-functional goals as well. Others in this symposium address this 
issue so I limit my discussion to evaluating the author’s claims on their own terms. 
 19. The ability of states to alter rules by treaty should also permit the emergence of efficient rules 
under the Mandatory View. 
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The Default View does not protect against such harm to the same 
degree. The withdrawing state may decide to opt out of the custom 
unilaterally. Thus the Default View would permit a state to withdraw from 
custom even when the costs of the withdrawal are higher for the rest of the 
world than the benefits to the withdrawing state.20 Here, the international 
system may experience a loss of welfare that would not have been possible 
under the Mandatory View. Under the Default View, states might still 
engage in treaty negotiations to establish an alternative rule, but the injured 
states would be seeking a treaty with the withdrawing state. Unlike the 
Mandatory View, the withdrawing state would not have to compensate the 
injured state for any damage done. Rather, the withdrawing state would be 
able to extract some concessions from the injured state as the price of 
agreeing to the new treaty rule. 
 The disadvantage of the Mandatory View, as Bradley and Gulati 
note, is the possibility for high transaction costs or holdout problems.21 
Negotiating bilateral or multilateral alternatives to custom can be 
expensive, particularly for smaller states. States may also resist forming 
mutually beneficial treaties in an attempt to gain a greater share of the joint 
gains.22 However, these costs also exist under the Default View. If a 
withdrawing state opts out of a customary rule and thereby creates a net 
loss for the international system, then these same transaction costs may be 
incurred as states attempt to negotiate an alternative rule through treaty 
law. Under the Default View, the withdrawing state would simply be the 
state be in the position to hold out from the agreement and extract more of 
the joint gains from any subsequent agreement. 
B. Evaluating Each Approach 
Both approaches to customary law allow states to opt out of custom 
but do so on different terms. Consequently, much of the analysis of which 
approach is more desirable depends on our perception of the value of 
contemporary customary international law. If most international custom 
could be altered without any loss to the international system, then the 
 
 20. We observe escape clauses in treaties where the benefits to one state of exiting the treaty are 
higher than the costs to the treaty partners. See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A 
Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 
298 (1991) (“A politically Pareto optimal escape clause would not allow parties to revoke concessions 
at will, but constrains escape to circumstances in which the gains to the party avoiding concessions 
exceed the costs to its trading partners.”). 
 21. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 41-42 (discussing the holdout problem under the 
Mandatory View). 
 22. See generally James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 
INT’L ORG. 269 (1998). 
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Mandatory View appears to impose unreasonably high transaction costs on 
states attempting to opt out of custom. Beneficial changes to international 
custom (i.e. changes that result in more gain for the withdrawing state than 
losses to other states) may not occur because of transaction costs. I will call 
these Type A costs—net beneficial alterations to customary law that are not 
undertaken because of the transaction costs of negotiating the change. But 
if most international custom is a net benefit for the international system—
that is, changes to the custom would impose greater costs on the 
international system than benefits gained by the withdrawing party—then 
the Default View is overly permissive. The Default View would allow one 
state to impose a net cost on the international system unilaterally. These are 
Type B costs—unilateral changes to customary law that impose a net cost. 
 At a system level, we are interested in minimizing the combination 
of Type A and Type B costs. The decision of whether to adopt the 
Mandatory View or the Default View depends on our relative concern 
about Type A costs (which are minimized by the Default View) and Type 
B costs (which are minimized by the Mandatory View). If we have good ex 
ante beliefs about what type of cost is more likely in different categories of 
custom, then we could adopt specific rules for different categories of 
custom. For instance, the Mandatory View could govern human rights law, 
while the Default View could govern international investment law. If we do 
not have good ex ante beliefs about different categories of custom, then the 
best approach would be a uniform rule for all custom. 
Evaluating the two approaches along functional lines, we need to have 
a belief about the quality of customary international law. If customary 
international law already incorporates rules that are net welfare increasing 
for the international community, then a shift towards the Default View may 
be welfare decreasing. Bradley and Gulati do not provide us a reason to 
believe that current international law is in need of significant change. They 
argue that the fact that the system of international customary law has not 
been changed does not mean that customary international law is efficient.23 
While this is a valid point, the authors fail to make the affirmative case that 
the rules established by customary international law (either all or some) are 
inefficient at the system level. Without such a case, the argument for the 
Default View remains incomplete. 
CONCLUSION 
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati have proposed a novel and 
provocative approach to international law. Their work has and will spur 
 
 23. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 242. 
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debate on the historic approaches to customary international law, the 
evolution of the current consensus view on international law, and whether 
we should maintain this consensus view in the future. Yet even on the 
authors’ own functional standard, it is unclear whether a shift to the Default 
View is desirable. Significant questions remain, including the effect of a 
change on treaty law, the contours of the Default View, and whether a 
system of unilateral withdrawal from custom would be beneficial for the 
international system. 
 
